tures of the security state are imbricated with political subjectivities and spatializing practices.

But policing and deportation also work in the obverse direction, and this is one of my key arguments. These securitization, thought to entrench the nation-state and to arrest flows, also enable the globalization of violence, in this case through the formation of transnational gangs and the globalization of U.S.-style zero-tolerance policing strategies. In other words, securitization not only constrain but also fuel mobility—legal and illegal, licit and illicit. Deportation as a disciplinary practice can act very differently, therefore, from its overt logic. Deportation is configured as a preeminent means of defending, enacting, and thus verifying state sovereignty, by defining who is disposable and who is not and rendering them immobile. But my ethno-architectural rendering of deportation through a study of the experiences of a specific category of criminal deportee suggests otherwise. When a deportee is forcibly repatriated after incarceration, or when Salvadoran youth are made refugees by the combined effects of gang and state violence in El Salvador, these “flows” are induced by nationalism and the entrenchment or policing of national boundaries. This study, therefore, concerned with the mobilities induced by such friction and the ways in which security policies and neoliberal trade agreements both rest upon and provoke flows across borders. This view in turn asks us to examine the relationship between neoliberalism and security policies.

Neoliberalism

While rooted in a longer history of United States-Latin American security relations, the transnational gang crisis and the securitization that produced it emerged during a period characterized by the consolidation of “neoliberal” structural adjustment programs in both countries. Neoliberalism is a multivalent term used variously to describe an economic model, a political philosophy, and a mode of personal conduct. As an economic model, neoliberalism promotes free trade, deregulation of the market, and the privatization of functions previously carried out by the state. As a political philosophy, it promotes the freedom of the individual over the power of the state, and private goods over public goods. As a discipline or mode of personal conduct, it advocates personal responsibility over social welfare. While neoliberalism is not a totalizing system, it is widely understood that its governing logic of market fundamentalism has had repercussions for forms of citizenship, subjectivity, and sovereignty across the globe.

Clearly, what has come to be termed “neoliberal” predates the period addressed in this book (1992–2007). The late 1970s marked the emergence of a new global order, variously described as globalization, disorganized or late capitalism, and post-Fordist and flexible accumulation, and more commonly termed neoliberalism or neoliberal globalization. Nonetheless, from an ethno-architectural point of view the effects of these neoliberal policies, the changing role of the state, and the emergence of a new regime of the self all become highly visible in both Los Angeles and San Salvador during the period under examination here.

In the United States, the neoconservative Reagan revolution of the 1980s was extended through the embrace and consolidation of a neoliberal agenda in the 1990s under the Clinton administration. The Clinton era represented a dramatic inversion of the binary opposition between conservatives and liberals that had characterized official American politics on domestic issues since the Great Depression. Thus while the subsequent election of Bill Clinton may have marked, for the time being, an end to the “rightward drift in U.S. politics,” Republicans had already successfully disorganized and inverted Democratic discourse precisely over the issue of state intervention and deregulation.

The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 accelerated the deindustrialization of U.S. cities, the exportation of U.S. jobs through off-shore production, the weakening of the traditional labor movement, and the flow of cheap, unprotected labor for the new service economy—all characteristics of the 1980s. During the same period, the institutional apparatus of the capitalist welfare state was entering its last moments before the full onset of neoliberalism in 1996 with the passage of welfare reform legislation. The state, which had produced a social service industry upon which the underclass fed, was to be redesigned along entrepreneurial lines. The welfare-dependent culture of poverty in the inner city was to be transformed into a culture of enterprise, family, and self-help. Both the government and the individual were to be disciplined according to the logic of the market, and state agencies began to address citizens as customers. By the turn of the century, conspicuous consumption and casino capitalism had become the pillars of society in the United States.

In El Salvador, well before the implementation of the Dominican Re-
public–Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) in 2006, privatization had affected all aspects of life, including health care, education, banking, and public utilities. William Robinson makes the somewhat ironic and tragic argument that the FMLN unwittingly provided the United States its pretext for massive intervention—not only through military but, in fact, largely through economic aid and training. The latter involved cultivating a new elite, or what Robinson terms a “neoliberal polyarchy,” that would challenge the old agricultural oligarchy as well as the more progressive “import substitution” economic model, and govern instead through a “market democracy.”

While the Peace Accords did contain a limited land reform agreement, by war's end the Salvadoran government had removed all subsidies on agricultural products, thereby leaving the beneficiaries of land reform without technical and financial assistance. El Salvador shifted from being a net exporter to a net importer of basic foodstuffs such as beans and rice. The cost of the “basic [food] basket,” the term of art in Salvadoran economic analyses, continued to rise each year.

By war's end, labor was El Salvador's primary export, and immigrant remittances exceeded coffee as the number one source of foreign revenue.

Needless to say, international migration did not abate with the end of the war but actually increased with rates of poverty and crime. Informal and criminal economies actively exploited new zones of ambiguity opened up by deregulation. In this new entrepreneurial and import-oriented society, these sectors of the economy became the only available alternatives to international migration for an increasing number of Salvadoreans. Like immigrant remittances, extortion became a fundamental means of survival within El Salvador's neoliberal economy. In this sense, migrants, gangs, and criminals are mimetic of the normative ideological figures of the neoliberal era, the entrepreneur and the consumer. It is for these reasons that I choose to add the modifier “neoliberal” to “securitiescapes.” I argue that a critique of neoliberalism must also account for the place of security policies in that system, and that focusing on security policy can further our understanding of processes associated with neoliberalism.

Zero Tolerance

The growing severity and scope of law enforcement accompanied by an increasingly punitive criminal justice system would seem to contradict the neoliberal logic to minimize state intervention. Indeed, Michel Foucault's anticipation that American neoliberalism would be accompanied by a more tolerant penal justice system has not been borne out. Foucault argued that while eighteenth-century reformers sought to “eliminate all crime through the internalization of the gaze,” neoliberals “only seek a degree of compliance—that is an acceptable level of return on society's investment.” Zero-tolerance gang-abatement strategies and the accompanying legislation, however, depend on the creation of a limitless supply of crime by subjecting more and more actions to penalties, and increasing the penalties of actions already deemed criminal. As such, the neoliberal security under investigation in this book diverges from Foucault's expectations that neoliberalism would entail “a balance between the curves of the supply of crime and negative demand,” where a certain degree of crime is to be tolerated.

Instead, zero-tolerance strategies appear to be central to the neoliberal logics of deregulation and individual responsibility. For instance, take the case of gang injunctions. Certainly they involve state intervention into and regulation of the minute practices of everyday life such as walking, whistling, gesturing, and associating in public. Gang injunctions criminalize these everyday behaviors and automatically increase the prison sentences of the particular group of people named in the injunction. At the same time, they are form of fast-track justice. Like deregulation in the marketplace, zero-tolerance policing strategies are key components of mechanisms that “cut the red tape” and “streamline bureaucracy” by removing all sorts of state protections: standards for probable cause, access to legal representation and judicial review, and judicial discretion. They also severely weaken the guarantee of habeas corpus. The result is to “fast track” (not surprisingly now used as a verb, much like “to grow” the economy) youth and young adults into the criminal justice system, and as a result, immigrants into the deportation pipeline. Habeas corpus, on the other hand, belongs to an alternative moral or ethical framework that demands absolute certainty that the state is arresting, imprisoning, and executing the right person. It is a “Byzantine” and lengthy process precisely because it is a guarantee of the most fundamental protection—legal redress against unconstitutional imprisonment and execution. Habeas corpus, in the words of Ned Walpin, “is the most basic way that the judiciary can protect our life and liberty against government tyranny.”

This fast-track justice has done much to “grow the economy” through privatizing prison functions such as dining, janitorial, and maintenance services. But more significantly, the production of new offenses and the
felonization of nonviolent offenses has required extensive new construction of prisons, which involves large government contracts with private companies. So, for instance, the single largest allocation in the Crime Bill of 1994 was for prison construction. The felonization of illegal reentry has also led to a vast and lucrative growth industry of detention centers all along the border between the United States and Mexico. The majority of these contracts have been filled by the private Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). According to the Web site of the CCA:

As a full-service corrections management provider, CCA specializes in the design, construction, expansion and management of prisons, jails and detention facilities, as well as inmate transportation services through its subsidiary company TransCor America. The company is the fourth-largest corrections system in the nation, behind only the federal government and two states. CCA houses approximately 80,000 offenders and detainees in more than 60 facilities, 42 of which are company-owned, with a total bed capacity of more than 80,000. Since its inception, CCA has maintained its market leadership position in private corrections, managing more than 50 percent of all beds under contract with such providers in the United States. The company joined the New York Stock Exchange in 1994 and now trades under the ticker symbol CWX.

The CCA is a perfect sign of the encroachment of the corporation into the functions of the state. It offers “full-service corrections management,” and it is a leader in the private corrections “market.” Moreover, prisoners and prisoners have achieved commodity status and are traded on the stock exchange. Between 2004 and 2008, Congress doubled its spending on these privately constructed and managed detention centers. In 2007, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed a Jail Construction Funding bill, which authorized the single biggest prison construction project in California, the United States, and indeed, the world. It seems that prisoners are as essential to market fundamentalism as are consumers. There is clearly a market logic to this neoliberal justice.

The neoliberal philosophies of “just desserts” and “truth in sentencing,” and the discourses that feed the construction of prisons and detention centers, derive their moral framework from the liberal conception of individual responsibility that was radically revived under neoliberalism. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Personal Re-

sponsibility and Work Opportunity Act, both of 1996, are both deeply beholden to this notion of the “responsibilization” of the individual. Criminals refuse to “responsibilize” themselves. This is not to say that gang youth are not agents in their own demonization, criminalization, and elimination; indeed, they are. However, neoliberal security discourses and practices displace all agency onto gang youths and their families, and do not account for the power of the law and law enforcement in producing and reproducing crime. Salvadoran (immigrant) youth gangs are produced and embedded in a complex web of forces. The people with whom I am in conversation in this book are neither demons nor heroes. Instead, they operate in complex and agentic ways within an over-determined transnational terrain, while struggling to distance themselves from the competing narratives of gangs and law enforcement without being able to fully escape either one.

Just as germane to this study is how neoliberalism has been accompanied by what Sasha Abramsky identifies as the “return of vengeance culture.” Over the last three decades, Americans have given up on rehabilitation for a soul-killing punitive mandate that seems to value little more than revenge, and where vengeance becomes a form of public spectacle. Abramsky dubs this structure of feeling and its affect “American furies.” The hard-line policing of immigrant and minority youth and young adults, combined with the deportation of legal permanent residents and the flourishing of prisons set aside solely for the incarceration of immigrants serving out sentences for “illegal reentry,” are surely central to this dominant structure of feeling.

The prevailing structures of feeling in postwar El Salvador—extreme disillusionment, suspicion, unbearable levels of social uncertainty, and fear—contradict the widely held belief in U.S. government and international relations circles that El Salvador’s transition to democracy was a success. Nonetheless, the great majority of Salvadorans no longer had expectations that the state could provide for either their economic or physical security. The Right quickly blamed the postwar penal code and human rights reforms for the uncontained violence, and it proffered zero-tolerance gang abatement strategies as developed by the United States as the necessary antidote to the “liberal excesses” of postwar democratization.

A great many championed the style of what Daniel Goldstein in The Spectacular City terms in the Bolivian case “flexible” or “self-help” justice, performed through private security patrols and vigilante Lynchings. A public opinion poll from 1998 indicated that 46 percent of the Salvadoran popula-
tion believed that people had the right to take justice into their own hands. While the new National Civil Police force (PNC) struggled to furnish its local and regional offices, private security agencies flourished. Numbering fewer than 10 in 1992, these private companies increased to more than 80 in 1995 and 265 in 2001. The number of private security agents more than tripled from 6,000 in 1996 to 18,943 in 2001, thereby far outnumbering officers in the National Civil Police.33 Private security companies and thus benefited directly from the failure of the state to contain the violence.

The globalization of a certain kind of market fundamentalism at the end of the cold war also required, it seems, the spread of tactics of policing and discipline that sought to ensure the continuous production of marginalized bodies in the form of cheap labor and criminals. Labor migration served the interests of the marketplace, and incarceration furnished the means with which the nation-state could secure the basis of its sovereignty and legitimate its monopoly over coercion. And yet, it appears that nationalism was not as successful as capitalism in this regard. Despite the seeming contradictions between the political economy of free trade and the postdisciplinary regime of zero-tolerance policing, both seem to produce the spaces of circulation and interconnection associated with globalization, whether through sanctioned or transgressive mobility. The concept of the neoliberal securityscape thus is a way of mapping the simultaneous spread of zero tolerance and neoliberal reforms across the United States and El Salvador, and the spatial outcome of these discourses and practices.

The Social Production of Space

While this book is embedded in the macrophysics of neoliberalism it maps the microphysics of everyday life, including the very particular ways in which immigrants, activists, gangs, and police produce, control, use, and compete over the space of the barrio, be it in Los Angeles or San Salvador or both. Indeed, the urban barrio is an important stage for the production of and contestation over the neoliberal securityscape and its transnational geographies of violence. As such, it is space—its production, representation, and use of its dimensions that serves as the primary interpretive thread throughout the book. The book builds upon the contention that history unfolds spatially, that space is central to the exercise and analysis of power and culture, and that every mode of production sequesters its own space.34 Consequently, each chapter focuses on a technology of spatial legislation (border patrols, curfews, gang injunctions, building design, etc.) or on the production of a particular kind of space.

My notion of the social production of space is derived from Henri Lefebvre's theorization in The Production of Space of the following spatial triad: representations of space, spaces of representation, and spatial practices. The first term, "representations of space," is understood as the conceptual, abstract formulations of space as modeled by social engineers (urban planners, government technocrats, criminologists, etc.), and it constitutes the savoir (knowledge) of power. The second term, "spaces of representation," is taken as the space of inhabitants, users, and activists. It is the dominated space that the imagination seeks to change and to appropriate—the connaissance (knowledge) of the underground and clandestine side of social life. These two spaces combine with the third term—"spatial practice," or movements and operations in physical space—to produce the space of a particular society and in this case, between particular societies, at a particular historical moment.

While Lefebvre distinguishes between dominant and resistant spatialities, in my analysis these spaces or systems are not separate from each other but rather deeply imbricated. For example, the spatial practices of law enforcement and what I term "gang peace activists" are strangely mimetic of one another.35 Their strategies—violence intervention and prevention versus gang abatement—while distinct, are both deeply beholden to mimicking the structure and practices of the gang itself. The spatial practices and performances of the police and of gang peace activists both involved mimetic improvisations of their object of transformation, the gang. Thus Lefebvre's model, in which mimesis has its role and function in the domination of space,36 is ultimately an unstable combustion of the trinity of these relatively coherent spatial forces. These relations of forces are always in the process of change, and are, in this case, made even more dynamic by their transnational reach.37 In this regard Michel de Certeau's elaboration of "the practice of everyday life" through his vocabulary of practiced space and travel itineraries—spatial trajectories, vectors of direction, geographies of action, and velocity—also inform my elaboration of the production of transnational space.38

The concept of the social production of space is particularly germane to the nexus of migration, youth, and violence, for territoriality is an issue central to immigrants, gangs, and police. On the one hand, "migration has always had the potential to challenge our established spatial images" of, for